PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS
AND SECTION 482:
THE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN
VIABILITY IN TAX PLANNING
INTRODUCTION

The personal service corporation (PSC) was recognized as a viable tax planning device several decades ago.' Congress defines a PSC
as "a corporation the principal activity of which is the performance of
personal services and [in which] such services are substantially performed by the employee-owners." ' 2 Both self-employed individuals
involved in business as sole proprietors and partnership members, as
well as the more typical service employees, have utilized the corporate
form for this purpose.' The professional corporation, often described
as a subdivision of the PSC, 4 has also emerged as a significant tax
planning instrument for doctors, lawyers, accountants, and other
professionals. 5
In many instances, the PSC consists of a single income-generating
individual "clothed" in the corporate form and operating under circumstances where no corporate structure had previously existed., In
such situations, where the nature and the character of business activi-

Fox v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938) and Laughton v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A.
101 (1939) were two early, cases in which the corporate structure of the PSC withstood efforts of
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) to disregard the corporation and to tax corporate
income to the sole corporate owner-employee.
2 I.R.C. § 269(A)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1983). Earlier the PSC was defined as:
a corporation whose income is to be ascribed primarily to the activities of the
principal owners or stockholders who are themselves regularly engaged in the active
conduct of the affairs of the corporation and in which capital .. .is not a material
income-producting factor ....
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 181, § 200, 40 Stat. 1057, 1059 (1919).
' Battle, The Use of Corporationsby Persons Who Perform Services to Gain Tax Advantages, 57 TAXES 797 (1979).
' Comment, Section 482 and the PersonalService Corporation, 126 ST. Louis U.L.J. 155,
157-59 (1981).
s See id.; see generally Bailey, Section 482 and the Aftermath of Foglesong: The Beginning
or the End for the Personal Service Corporation, 15 IND. L.J. 639, 642-43 (1982); Banoff,
Reducing the Income Tax Burden of ProfessionalPersons by Use of Corporations,Joint Ventures,
Subpartnerships and Trusts, 58 TAXES 968 (1980).
' As a result, the PSC structure is strictly scrutinized by the IRS. This is particularly true
when an individual previously taxed on all his business activities incorporates and thereby shifts
the taxable income from those activities to the corporation without any fundamental change in
the operation of its business. American Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828, 839 (1971).
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ties are not affected by incorporation, a tension between two basic but
conflicting tax policies has grown to an ominous level. 7 The first policy
involves the efficacy of graduated income tax rates and attempts to
limit the availability of income shifts and deferrals by taxing the
actual earner of income.8 The second policy involves the recognition
of the corporation as a separate taxable entity distinct from its owners
and employees. 9 This second policy is seriously threatened by strict
adherence to the first.' 0
In an effort to promote the first policy, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) has challenged the tax viability of the PSC
structure. The Service has attacked the corporate status of the PSC
through the application of both common law doctrines and statutory
provisions designed to correct distortion of income attribution between related taxable entities." The many weapons of the IRS in this
area have recently been supplemented by the enactment of Internal
Revenue Code section 269A of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) .12 This allocation provision, which autho' See Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155
(1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
8 Banoff, supra note 5, at 971.
' See Bailey, supra note 5, at 641.

10 If the IRS believes that the individual employee and not the corporation has earned the

income through the performance of services, the Commissioner will attempt to disregard the
corporate existence for tax purposes in order to tax the employee directly on the service income.
If the corporation is completely disregarded, the owner-employee would lose all benefits of
incorporation. See id. at 639.
11 See generally Battle, supra note 3, at 802-06; Bailey, supra note 5, at 643-60; Burdett,
Foglesong's Sec. 482 Approach May Threaten Closely-Held Personal Service Corporations, 53
J. TAX'N 330 (1980); Comment, supra note 4.
11 Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 250(a), 96 Stat. 528 (1982) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 269A (West
Supp. 1983). The section provides in part:
If (1) substantially all of the services of a personal service corporation are performed
for (or on behalf of) one other . . . entity, and (2) if the principal purpose for
forming, or availing of such personal service corporation is the avoidance or evasion
of Federal income tax by reducing the income of, or securing the benefit of any
expense, deduction, credit, exclusion, or other allowance for, any employee-owner
which would not otherwise be available, then the Secretary may allocate all income,
deductions, credits, exclusions, and other allowances between such personal service
corporation and its employee-owners, if such allocation is necessary to prevent
avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax or clearly . . . reflect the[ir] income[s] ...
I.R.C. § 269A(a) (West Supp. 1983).
The provision authorizes the Commissioner of the IRS to disregard the corporate structure
for tax purposes by taxing corporate income directly to its owner-employees. Coleman, Section
269A-P.C.'s after TEFRA, 188 N.Y.L.J., Oct 22, 1982, at 1, col. 1. The section is applicable
where a PSC, which was incorporated for the principal purpose of exploiting income tax
benefits, provides substantially all its services to one other entity or to related entities. Id.
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rizes the Commissioner to functionally disregard the corporate entity,
may have nullified the usefulness of applying the structure to a partnership of corporations.13 Additionally, TEFRA will equalize available pension and retirement programs between corporations and noncorporate businesses by 1984. 14 Thus, one of the principal advantages
of incorporating a small business or trade will be extinguished by the
elimination of traditionally favorable corporate retirement and pension plan allowances. 15
Despite the relentless efforts of the Service to extend the application
of its arsenal against the PSC, and despite the congressional enactment
of TEFRA eliminating favorable corporate deferral plans, the PSC
continues to retain much of its vitality as a valuable aspect of tax
planning.' 6 Some of the more significant advantages of the corporate
form that remain include: (1) lower corporate tax rates which make it
beneficial for the corporation to accumulate earnings which may
either be distributed as employee benefits or used for capital invest-

"3 See Coleman, supra note 12. The section primarily affected the corporate partner who
provided substantially all his services to the partnership while incorporation was principally for
exploiting benefits from corporate welfare and deferral plans. Id.; cf. 128 CONC. REC. S10903
(daily ed. August 19, 1982) where Senator Dole suggested that the section should not be activated
where the corporate form was utilized to obtain corporate pension and retirement plans.
Section 269A also eliminated the opportunity to split income between an established corporation and a second corporation organized to render services (which were originally performed
by the corporation now receiving the services) to that established corporation. Since the service
corporation rendered substantially all of its services to one entity, and since it would be difficult
to show legitimate incorporation purpose other than the avoidance, the PSC should be subject to
allocation under § 269A. See Coleman, supra note 12. The section has sometimes been referred to
as the anti-Keller provision, because this undesirable corporate structure withstood a pre-269A
IRS challenge in Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. 1982); see Coleman, supra note 12, at 2. For a review of the planning necessary to
avoid the application of § 269A, see McGill & Davis, The Personal Service CorporationAfter
TEFRA: An Analysis of Section 269A and the Proposed Regulations, 61 TAxES 540, 547 (1983).
11 Section 235(a)(2) of TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 50 (1982) (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 415(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1983)) amended I.R.C. § 415 (c)(1)(a) to reduce the maximum
annual amount that may be funded to a pension plan of a corporation.
'1 TEFRA also eliminated many of the other advantages of corporate pension plans. See
Chapman, The Future of Personal Service Corporations,24 Amaz. L. REV. 503, 520-21 (1982); see
also Lewis, Taxation of Private Pension Plans under T.E.F.R.A.: Keogh Remembered, 68
A.B.A. J. 1568 (1982); Luepker, Qualified Retirement Plans: Opportunities and Obligations
Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 64 Cm. B. REc. 74 (1982); Sollee,
TEFRA's Top-Heavy Plan Rules Will Have Major Impact Upon Plans of All Employees, 57 J.
TAX'N 266 (1982).
"o See M. Sildon, The IncorporatedLaw Firm and Retirement Plansfor Law Firms: Living
in Peaceful Co-existence with TEFRA or Is There Life After Death for the Incorporated Law

Firm, A.B.A. CONFERENCE ON TAXATION (January 29, 1983) (unpublished seminar outline); see

also Chapman, supra note 15, at 522-24; McGill & Davis, supra note 13, at 549.
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ment and future business needs; 17 (2) the exclusion from gross income
of corporate welfare contributions to medical insurance 8 and reimbursement plans; 19 and (3) the ability to defer income by shifting the
corporate fiscal year and making after-calendar-year compensation
payments. 20 Accordingly, for the taxpayer in a position to exploit the
numerous remaining benefits of incorporation, the PSC will retain its
2
role as a significant tax planning consideration. '
In order for the PSC to maintain its role as a tax planning device,
the basic assumption that income earned through the services of the
corporation's owner-employee is taxed solely to the corporate entity
and not to the individual who renders the services must be acknowledged. The acceptance of this assumption, however, is premised upon
unequivocal support for the crucial determination that the corporation rather than its owners are the recognized taxable earners of
income.22

1' Feuer, Section 482, Assignment of Income Principles and Personal Service Corporations,
59 TAxEs 564, 565 (1981); see also Banoff, supra note 5, at 970; Sildon, supra note 16, at 3.
18 I.R.C. § 79 (1976). The corporation may deduct the cost of up to a $50,000 group term life

insurance plan. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1978 and Supp. 1983). The employee loses the exclusion if the
plan discriminates in favor of key employees. I.R.C. § 79(d) (1976). Disability and health
insurance provided by the corporate employer may be excluded by the employee under I.R.C.
§ 106 (1976). See Chapman, supra note 15, at 522.
19 I.R.C. § 105 (West 1967 and Supp. 1983). The corporation may not adopt a plan which
discriminates in favor of key employees. I.R.C. § 105(h) (Supp. V 1981). The corporation may
deduct all the reimbursed medical expenses it pays out under its plan. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1978
and Supp. 1983). See Battle, supra note 3, at 798-99. This corporate benefit has become even
more significant since deductible individual medical expenses have been further limited to the
excess over five percent of adjusted gross income under I.B.C. § 213(a) (West Supp. 1983).
20 Banoff, supra note 5, at 970. Numerous other available benefits of incorporation include
the deductibility of 85% of dividend income under I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) (1976), the exclusion of
child care benefits under I.R.C. § 129 (Supp. V 1981), cafeteria plan benefits under I.R.C. § 125
(Supp. V 1981), employee-provided transportation under I.R.C. § 124 (Supp. V 1981), educational assistance programs under I.R.C. § 127 (Supp. V 1981), and possible state tax advantages.
See Sildon, supra note 16, at 3-6; Feuer, supra note 17, at 565.
21 The individual taxpayer must weigh the available advantages against the disadvantages of
the corporate form. The limited disadvantages include higher employment taxes for corporations, federal and state unemployment taxes, license fees, filing fees and franchise taxes, the
expense of additional recordkeeping, and the potential for double income taxes. Chapman, supra
note 15, at 524-25.
22 See Bailey, supra note 5, at 641; Burdett, supra note 11.
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Over the past two decades, section 482,23 which governs income
allocation between related taxpayers, has developed into one of the
Commissioner's primary methods of control over corporate abuses
found within the PSC structure. 24 Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have declared their preference for utilizing this section to control
income attribution between a PSC and its owner-employee. 5 Nevertheless, traditional weapons of the Service, including the assignment
of income and sham corporation doctrines, continue to be used concurrently with section 482 for the purpose of combatting abuses of the
corporate form. A combination of these weapons has enabled the IRS
to discourage taxpayers from utilizing the corporate "cloak" to disguise the "true earner" and thereby distort their personal taxable
income.26
Section 482 has since evolved into an all-encompassing weapon of
the IRS. Its application has been extended to control most instances of
income distortion resulting from the use of the PSC structure. 2 ' Recent
cases have amplified the reach of section 482 by liberally interpreting
its requirements. 28 As a consequence of these expansive decisions, it
was feared that virtually every incidence of income manipulation
found within the PSC structure would become subject to reallocation
under section 482.29

I.R.C. § 482 (1976) (Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers) provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations,
trades, or businesses.
24 See, e.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933,
reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982); Keller v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. 1982); Jordon v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 872 (1973); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), afJ'd, 358 F.2d
342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
25 Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102
(1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d
650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), affld, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
28 See, e.g., Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. 1982) (Commissioner attempted to tax corporate employee on assignment of income
principles or, alternatively, under § 482).
27 See generally Comment, supra note 4.
28 See infra notes 140-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
21 See Bailey, supra note 5, at 659.
23

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:121

The recent decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Foglesong v. Commissioner3 ° has considerably narrowed the reach of
section 482 through the enforcement of a more stringent standard of
applicability. This more restrictive application of section 482 should
have a positive impact on the continued utility of the PSC, since the
taxpayer may now avoid the burdensome effect of this mandatory
3
reallocation provision through a prudential incorporation scheme. '
This Comment examines both the traditional attacks upon the
PSC 32 and the evolution of section 482 from its initial application to its
most expansive interpretation in the PSC setting. 33 Section 482's newly
developed standard of applicability and the Service's remaining common law attacks are then analyzed to determine their future impact
34
on the PSC structure.
TRADITIONAL SERVICE ATTACKS ON THE

PSC

A review of federal tax legislation over the past half century
reveals that Congress has implicitly recognized the validity of the PSC
structure for tax purposes. 35 An array of Internal Revenue Code provisions 36 regulate the PSC by penalizing the taxpayer for participation
in undesirable corporate transactions. These sections, however, do not
attempt to disregard the corporation in order to tax the individual
owning or controlling the entity.3 7 In spite of this apparent congressional sanction, the PSC structure has been closely scrutinized by the IRS
in an effort to correct income distortion resulting from the exploitation
of income splitting or deferral opportunities made available through
38
the corporate status.

30

691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).

31 See Bailey, supra note 5, at 642.
32 See infra notes 35-123 and accompanying text.

33 See infra notes 124-99 and accompanying text.
3, See infra notes 200-36 and accompanying text.
35 Battle, supra note 3, at 802.
38 I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (West 1967 and Supp. 1983), the personal holding provisions, assess an
additional tax on accumulated corporate earnings qualifying as personal holding company
income, and I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1976 and Supp. V 1981), the accumulated earnings provisions,
automatically tax accumulated earnings of a corporation in excess of $150,000 under .§
535(c)(2)(B), in excess of $250,000 under § 5135(c)(2)(A), or a higher amount computed under
§ 535(c)(1).
3' Battle, supra note 3, at 802; see O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 1969)
(viewed federal legislative tax history as "indicative of congressional recognition of corporations
[such as an association of professionals] and of the fact that under Federal tax law they would be
taxed as corporation").
31 See Banoff, supra note 5, at 971.
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Several tax avoidance schemes are utilized in the PSC setting
which the Commissioner of the IRS seeks to discourage through the
application of his statutory and common law weapons. Some of the
more popular plans include: (1) in a controlled corporation, undercompensating the controlling employee(s) in order to accumulate
earnings to be diverted to lower bracket taxpayers 39 or retained by the
corporation as accumulated surplus; 40 (2) offsetting income of the
corporation, which was made available by undercompensating the
controlling employee against the losses of an unrelated business by
utilizing a loss deduction that would not otherwise have been useful to
that business; 4' and (3) paying excessive compensation to corporate
taxable income of the corporaemployee(s) for the purpose of shifting
4
tion to its controlling employee(s) . 2
Among the statutory weapons traditionally utilized by the Service to attack these schemes are the personal holding company provisions (PHC), 43 the accumulated earnings tax provisions (AET), 44 the
business deductions provision, 45 and the disallowance provision of

" See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'g and remanding,
35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976) (income earned by PSC diverted to controlling taxpayer's children
in form of dividends).
40 Feuer, supra note 17, at 565. See Taft, "'The PC and Sec. 531," 188 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17,
1982, at 1, col. 1, for a review of the advantages of accumulating earnings in the one-man
professional corporation, as well as tax planning necessary to avoid the effect of the accumulated
earnings tax.
41 See, e.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933,
reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), alfd, 358 F.2d 342
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
42 Feuer, supra note 17, at 565. The purpose of this scheme could be to "zero out" corporate
income, to avoid double taxation, or to shift income to lower tax bracket employees who
sometimes can offset the income with loss deductions from other personal transactions. See id. at
565.
43 I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (West 1967 and Supp. 1983). Under § 541, undistributed personal
holding income, as defined in § 545, is taxed at a rate of 50%. Under § 542, a personal holding
company is any nonexempt closely held corporation whose personal holding company income (as
defined in § 543(a)) is at least 60% of its adjusted gross income (as defined in § 543(b)(2)).
41 I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1976 and Supp. V 1981). Under § 532, any nonexempt or nonpersonal
holding company which accumulates earnings and profits by failing to divide or distribute them
for the purpose of avoiding income tax is subject to an accumulated earnings tax. Accumulated
taxable income is calculated by adjusting taxable income of the corporation under § 535(b) and
subtracting the dividends paid deduction (as defined by § 561) and the accumulated earnings
credit (as defined by § 535(c)). This income is taxed under § 531 at a rate of 27 1/2% for the first
$100,000 and 38 1/2% for the excess.
6
41 I.R.C. § 1 2(a)(1) (West 1978 and Supp. 1983).
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section 269. 4 6 The effectiveness and overall fairness of these sections
7
without the aid of section 482, however, is somewhat questionable.4
Both the PHC provisions and the AET provisions have a limited
ability to combat the aforementioned abuses of the corporate structure. The earnings of a PSC are not subject to an additional PHC tax
unless these earnings qualify as PHC income under section 543 .48
Furthermore, the corporate income from personal services would not
be characterized as such unless a third party contracting with the
corporation had the right to designate a corporate employee who is a
twenty-five percent shareholder as the service performer. 49 Even if the
section were to be applied, it would likely be of little consequence in
the PSC setting since the additional tax would be based solely on those

I.R.C. § 269 (1976). Section 269(a) provides:
If (1) any person or persons acquire . . . control of a corporation, or (2) any
corporation acquires . . . property of another corporation . . . and the principal
purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal
income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which
such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary may
disallow such deduction, credit, or other allowance.
I.R.C. § 269 (1976). For a general review of the requisites for the application of § 269, see Watts,
Acquisitions Made to Avoid Taxes: Section 269, 34 TAx L. REV. 539 (1979).
11 One commentator has argued that the statutory provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
aside from § 482, are incapable of effectively controlling the most popular tax avoidance schemes
involving a PSC. Feuer advocated a § 482 analysis complemented by the efficient use of common
law doctrines. Feuer, supra note 17, at 565.
48 I.R.C. § 543 (West 1967 and Supp. 1983). Personal holding company income is defined as
the adjusted gross income of the corporation consisting of dividends, interest, royalties, and
annuities under § 543(a)(1), rents under § 543(a)(2), mineral, oil, and gas royalties under §
543(a)(3), copyright royalties under § 543(a)(4), product film rents under § 543(a)(5), compensation for use of corporate property under § 543(a)(6), personal service contract income under §
543(a)(7), and estates and trusts related income under § 543(a)(8). See generally Wood, Avoiding
Personal Holding Company Income for Professional Corporations: Is It Really So Simple? 59
TAXES 685 (1981).
10 I.R.C. § 543(a)(7) (1976); see Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980). In FoglesongI, income earned by the PSC
through services of the controlling employee was not characterized as personal holding company
income because the corporation, rather than the employee, was responsible for the fulfillment of
the corporation's service contracts pursuant to a valid novation substituting the PSC as the
service performer. The mere expectation that a certain party was to perform the services
contracted for was insufficient to transform corporate earnings into personal holding company
income. Id. at 1314-15.
46
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corporate earnings which were accumulated as taxable income and
50
which were not distributed as dividends.
In the event an entity is not characterized as a personal holding
company, the IRS could still apply the AET provisions against a
closely held PSC. Such action would result in the imposition of an
additional tax on those earnings of the corporation which were accu51
mulated as undistributed income in excess of no less than $150,000.
As a result, the AET provisions would have a restricted ability to
prevent income distortion caused by a taxpayer who attempted to split
income between himself and his controlled corporation by allowing
his lower tax bracket corporation to accumulate income earned by the
52
services of its controlling employee.
Internal Revenue Code section 162(a)(1), the "reasonable salaries" subsection of the business deductions provision, is said to control
the third type of PSC tax avoidance scheme, which involves overcompensation of corporate employees. This section treats a corporation's
compensation distributions in excess of a reasonable amount as nondeductible corporate dividend distributions. 53 Since the compensation
deduction is lost, undesirable treatment of corporate salary distributions results. The excessive compensation is subject to double taxation,
first as corporate income and second as dividend distributions which
could not have been reclaimed by the corporation and treated as

50 See Battle, supra note 3, at 812. For most personal holding companies there should seldom

be corporate earnings remaining to be characterized as PHC income once deductions are taken
for business expenses and capital reinvestment and once the controlling employee(s) are compensated by deductible salary and corporate welfare plan benefit payments. Id. at 812. The oneman professional corporation, which appears to be most vulnerable to an attack under the
personal holding company provisions, would not be subject to the additional tax unless the PSC's
owner-employee's services were of such a unique nature that no other person could be substituted
by the corporation as the service performer. Rev. Rul. 75-67, 1975-1 CB 169. The ruling appears
to refer to actors, authors, and other professionals with unique talents.
"' Feuer, supra note 17, at 565. Under § 535(c), a minimum credit of $250,000 is granted in
determining the accumulated taxable income of a corporation. I.R.C. § 535(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V
1981). If the corporation is a service corporation engaged in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting, the minimum
credit is reduced to $150,000. I.R.C. § 535(c)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981). Notwithstanding these
designated amounts, the credit can be increased to an amount equal to the accumulated earnings
necessary to fulfill the reasonable business needs of the corporation. I.R.C. § 535(c)(1) (1976).
11 For a discussion of the availability of restructuring a corporation with accumulated
earnings as a personal holding company while avoiding the tax consequences on these accumulations, see Galvin, Interplay of Accumulated Earningsand PHC ProvisionsMay Benefit Inactive
Corporations,54 J. TAX'N 24 (1981).
53 Battle, supra note 3, at 808. Included within the definition of "other compensation for
personal services" under § 162(a)(1) are deferred payments such as contributions to qualified
retirement and pension plans. Id.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:121

accumulated earnings. 54 In the PSC setting, however, the section
should not have a significant effect on tax planning since it would be
difficult for the IRS to successfully deny a deduction by arguing that
the controlling employee of a PSC was overcompensated when it is
normally his services that are principally responsible for corporate
55
earnings.
When the IRS determines that the primary purpose of an acquisition of a corporation is tax avoidance or evasion through the entitlement of a deduction credit or other allowance unavailable absent the
acquisition, the deduction, credit, or allowance may be disallowed
under section 269.56 Section 269's capacity to discourage tax avoidance
schemes in the PSC area, however, has been limited. 57 The section
should rarely serve to deny corporate allowances primarily because
proof of a valid business purpose as the motive for the corporate
58
acquisition should be sufficient to avoid the effect of the provision.
As a consequence of Congress' failure to provide the IRS with
effective weapons to combat tax avoidance schemes in the PSC setting, the Commissioner had little alternative but to rely on two sepa-

Feuer, supra note 17, at 565.
Battle, supra note 3, at 809.
56 I.R.C. § 269 (1976). Section 269(a) provides:
If (1) any person or persons acquire . . . control of a corporation, or (2) any
corporation acquires . . . property of another corporation . . . and the principal
purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal
income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which
such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary may
disallow such deduction, credit, or other allowance.
For a general review of the requisites for the application of § 269, see Watts, supra note 46.
57 Watts, supra note 46. In fact, it has been suggested that the statute be completely
eliminated. This is based on the view that its utility is far outweighed by the problems created by
the ambiguous nature of the provision and because no clear guidelines have developed to assist in
interpreting its broad statutory language. Id.
55 Banoff, supra note 5, at 972-73; cf. Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114
(1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966). Borge and Ach involved situations in which § 269
was applied to deny carryover loss deductions to corporations acquired or created solely to utilize
these allowances to offset income from an unrelated business. The section may have become
obsolete since the enactment of specific Internal Revenue Code provisions and treasury regulations which contain rules for denying loss carryovers, credits, multiple surtax exemptions, and
built-in losses which have traditionally been the subject of § 269 disallowances. Watts, supra
note 46, at 566.
54

55
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rate but related common law doctrines to spearhead the attack-the
sham corporation doctrine and the assignment of income doctrine.
The distinctions between the two doctrines have often been blurred. 5
The sham doctrine is functionally a subdivision of the more
general "disregard theory" which operates, under certain circumstances, to disregard the corporate status.6 0 If the corporate form is
disregarded, corporate benefits are denied and the earnings taxed to
the corporate employee who generated the income through the performance of services."' In recent years, the sham corporation doctrine
has become the principal argument of the IRS when it attempts to
disregard the corporate status. The business purpose or activity test
6 2
has developed into the primary means of analysis under the doctrine.
In Moline Properties v. Commissioner,6 3 the United States Supreme
Court designated the "business purpose or activity text" as the standard of corporate recognition. The Court ruled that as long as a PSC
could show either an incorporation motive other than tax avoidance
or the existence of business activity subsequent to its formation, the
corporation would be recognized as a viable taxable entity distinct
from its owners and employees. 4 This liberal standard of corporate

11The Tax Court has suggested that the distinction between the doctrines is more semantic
than it is substantive. Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1031 (1981), appeal docketed, No.
82-1414 (10th Cir. 1982).
o See generally Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead
Dummy Should Live, 34 TAX. L. REv. 213 (1979) (comprehensive discussion of the disregard
theory).
Several grounds other than sham principles have previously been used to disregard the
corporate entity for tax purposes. The corporate status has been disregarded: (1) if the IRS
determined that the PSC was the "alter-ego" of the corporation's owner-employee, see Laughton
v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939); (2) if the "substance over the form" of the corporate
structure revealed that it lacked substance, see Rubin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 257 (1968),
rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying substance over form principles in
assignment context); (3) if it was determined that the PSC had failed to carry on "business
activity" in the corporate form, see Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436
(1943); or (4) if the PSC had failed to show a "business purpose" for incorporation, see id.;
Noonan v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). Most of the aforementioned disregard principles
have now been incorporated into the sham doctrine analysis.
"I Banoff, supra note 5, at 971. Two early cases, Fox v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938)
and Laughton v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939) withstood IRS challenges under the sham
corporation doctrine. The Laughton court supported the proposition that "[a]s a general rule a
corporation and its stockholders are deemed separate entities and this is true in respect of tax
problems." Id. at 106 (citing New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934)).
12 See Comment, supra note 5, at 159-62.
" 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
61 Id. at 439.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:121

recognition, later refined in National Carbide v. Commissioner,6 5
effectively precluded the disregard of the corporate status under the
sham corporation doctrine in all but extreme cases. 6 The threshold
standard of recognition has diminished to such a point that the difficulties involved with the Commissioner's burden of proof have made
it undesirable for the IRS to challenge the PSC under the sham
67
doctrine when other more efficient means are available.
The principles of assignment of income under section 61 were
conceived by the Supreme Court in the noteworthy case, Lucas v.
Earl.8 In Earl, income that the taxpayer had assigned to his wife

" 336 U.S. 422 (1949). The Supreme Court developed a six-factor analysis to determine
whether a corporation should be excepted from the status of a separate taxable entity and treated
merely as an agent. Factors that were relevant to the agency evaluation included:
[w]hether the corporation [(1)] operates in the name and for the account of the
principal, [(2)] binds the principal by its actions, [(3)] transmits money received [by
it] to the principal, and [(4)] whether receipt of income is attributable to the services
of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal ....
Id. at 437.
The final two factors were critical and it was necessary to comply with them in order for the
corporation to receive agency status. These two factors required that the corporation's "relations
with its principal . . . not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal" and that
'[ilts business purpose . . . be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent." Id.
16 A sufficient business purpose may be the desire to limit liability or expand one's business
through the corporate form and a satisfactory showing of business activity may be accomplished
in some instances by respecting all corporate formalities. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d
865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th
Cir. 1982).
The sham corporation doctrine may survive in those situations where the existence of tax
avoidance motives for incorporation is supported only by a limited showing of business activity.
See Noonan v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 907 (1969) (Tax Court declined to accept incorporation
purpose espoused by taxpayer and in absence of any real showing of business activity, sham
corporation doctrine was applied to disregard corporate form); Comment, supra note 4, at 162
(stricter standard of scrutiny is exercised by courts on those corporations formed for tax avoidance purposes because incorporation of closely held PSCs is presumed to be tax motivated).
Occasionally, a court may apply a more stringent form of the business purpose or activity
test. For example, the court of appeals in Kimbrell v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1967) examined the substance of a PSC structure and found the absence of sufficient business
activities undertaken by the corporation to meet the Moline Properties business purpose or
activities test. The court disregarded the corporate structure even though the taxpayer had
satisfied all requisite corporate formalities. Kimbrell involved commissions collected by controlled corporations of the taxpayer which were earned through the services of the controlling
individual without any assistance from the corporate entity and without any agency or employee
relationship between the taxpayer and the corporations. The Fifth Circuit supported its holding
under the sham corporation doctrine by reaching the same conclusion through the application of
assignment of income principles. Id. at 902.
67 See, e.g., Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981),
appeal docketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. 1982) (basing determination on § 482 analysis); Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365
(1969) (basing determination on true earner of income analysis).
68 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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through a contract of joint ownership was reallocated back to the
taxpayer to be taxed as his own income. 9 The Court condemned
income shifts which fail to attribute income to its true earner by
composing the now famous analogy prohibiting "the fruits ' 7[to be]
attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew. 0
The suspect structure of the PSC became a prime target for the
application7 ' of the true earner concept of the assignment of income
7 2
doctrine. This concept, designated the "first principle of taxation,was utilized by the Service to correct income distortion between related taxpayers. Essentially, the Service sought to accomplish the
identical result through the assignment of income doctrine as it had
through the use of the sham corporation doctrine. Upon its application, the corporation would, in effect, be ignored and its earnings
taxed to the individual responsible for generating it through the per73
formance of services.
Although assignment of income principles were initially rejected
in two significant early cases involving PSCs, the Service successfully
challenged the structure of the PSC in Rubin v. Commissioner (Rubin
I).74 The Tax Court in Rubin I applied both substance-over-form
principles and the assignment of income doctrine to tax a service
employee on income collected by his controlled PSC. 75 The PSC was
established as a management service corporation rendering services

60 Id. at 114-15.
11 Id. at 115.
71 See Bailey, supra note 5, at 647.
71 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739 (1949).
73 Bailey, supra note 5, at 647-48 (citing Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930)).
74 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56
T.C. 1155 (1971), af'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing Laughton v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 101 (1939); Fox v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938)). In Fox, a notable cartoonist
transferred cartoon copyrights and related contracts to his controlled PSC. The PSC then
contracted for syndication rights to the cartoon and collected earnings substantially in excess of
the compensation it paid out to Fox pursuant to an exclusive employment agreement. Id. at 27276. In Laughton, an actor formed a PSC through which his services were loaned out to various
organizations who contracted with the PSC. Laughton's compensation, which he received
pursuant to a five year exclusive employment agreement, was substantially less than the total
earnings collected by the PSC. 40 B.T.A. at 102-05.
11 Id. at 264-66. The taxpayer failed to sustain his burden of showing that the Commissioner's allocation was unreasonable by proving that his dealings with the PSC as an employee had
substance and economic reality. No business purpose of the PSC was evidenced and the taxpayer
failed to show that the corporate form was respected. Id. at 265. In addition, it was shown that
hired parties continually ignored the existence of the PSC, and the company receiving the
services referred to the taxpayer as its personal employee. Id. at 256-57.
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exclusively to a related corporation, Dorman Mills, which the taxpayer had gained control over. 76 Rubin was solely responsible for the
earnings of the PSC which were attributable to the management
services he performed under a contract arrangement between Dorman
77
Mills and his corporation.
Although the Tax Court recognized the validity of the PSC for
tax purposes, it concluded that Rubin should be taxed on the PSC's net
income from management services because he was in substance the
"true earner" of the income. 78 The court based its holding on the
control Rubin maintained over the earning of income. 79 Two early
cases, Fox v. Commissioner and Laughton v. Commissioner,80 which
had rejected the assignment of income analysis were carefully distinguished. The determinative factors were Rubin's control over both the
PSC and the serviced corporation; the fact that Rubin was not contractually bound to perform services for the PSC; and the fact that
Rubin did not actually perform services exclusively for the PSC.s 1
Rubin was therefore found to have control over the services he performed and consequently over the earnings of the PSC from the
82
rendition of management services.
Although Rubin I was reversed and remanded by the Second
Circuit on appeal, the Tax Court continued to rely on the control over
earnings test in subsequent cases. In both Morrison v. Commissioner83
'6 Id. at 255. Dorman Mills, which was in serious financial trouble, was originally a
customer of Rubin's. Initially, Rubin entered into an agreement between Dorman Mills and his
controlled PSC whereby services would be rendered to Dorman Mills in an effort to spur the
economic well-being of the business. Rubin thereafter became substantially involved in all phases
of Dorman Mills' business and eventually became the chief executive and chairman of the board.
Id. at 254-58.
" Id. at 266. The PSC's other two shareholder-employees utilized the income generated by
the management services and loan payments to operate an art business of which they remained
substantially in charge. Id. at 261.
s Id.at 265-66.
o Id.
80 Fox, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938); Laughton, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939).
11 Id. at 266-67. The court pointed out that Rubin negotiated the management service
contract before he incorporated the PSC, that Rubin worked for several other businesses during
the same period he worked for the PSC, and that the PSC received no consideration upon the
termination of the service contract with Dorman Mills when Rubin negotiated the sale of the
corporation. The Tax Court believed these facts were evidence of the control Rubin exercised
over the income earned from the management services he performed. Id. at 266.
85

Id.

83 54 T.C. 758 (1970). Morrison, who was himself unlicensed, owned a half interest in an

insurance corporation. He performed services by referring customers to his licensed corporate
partner in return for a portion of the commissions which were funneled through the corporation.
The court determined that the taxpayer failed to show that the corporation contributed to the
earning of income. Id. at 762.
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and McIver v. Commissioner,84 the Tax Court applied the assignment
of income doctrine to tax the earnings of the PSCs to the controlling
employees who had generated the income through the performance of
services. The Tax Court reasoned that the inability of the corporation
to directly carry on the business under state law was an indication,
along with other factors, that the corporation did not control the
earning of income.8 5 Similarly, in Roubik v. Commissioner,8 6 corporate income was taxed to the controlling employees of a professional
corporation because the court determined that the individuals, rather
than the corporation, carried on the activities of the business.8 7 The
Tax Court found that the PSC acted merely as a conduit to funnel
income through to its service employees because it was never allowed
to actually control the services of its employees, and thus failed to
88
exercise control over the earning of income.
The prominence of the assignment of income doctrine argument
in the PSC context was seriously curtailed by two Federal circuit court
opinions rejecting the use of the doctrine as the primary weapon to be
utilized against the PSC structure. In Rubin v. Commissioner (Rubin
II), 8 9 the Second Circuit determined that the use of the true earner
and substance-over-form principles to readjust income between a taxpayer and his controlled PSC was inappropriate in light of the more

-1 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 719 (1977). Mclver, a licensed real estate broker, was taxed on
commission income from the sale of property because there were no contributions to the earning
of income that the corporation could have performed in the absence of a license. Id.
8- Id.; see also Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975) (income reallocated from PSC to
its controlling employee because corporation was precluded by law from conducting business of
court reporting and therefore could not have earned the income derived from that business). But
see Shaw v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 375 (1972) (inability of corporation to perform licensed
services under state law was not a consideration in court's determination of true substance of
transactions).
86 53 T.C. 365 (1969). The corporation, which acted as an association of radiologists, did not
own equipment, incur debts, enter exclusive employment contracts with its employee-shareholders, or occupy office space. The only corporate expenses were the salary payments to a secretary
for keeping the books. Id. at 366-78.
87 Id. at 378-81.
86 See id. But see Gettler v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 442 (1975) (PSC consisting of
two law partners and nonlawyer held to have earned corporate income, citing as determinative
factors existence of valid business purpose for incorporating and absence of significant tax
advantages gained through incorporation): Estate of Cole v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH)
313 (1973) (PSC conducting foreign concert tours for its entertainer-employee held to have
earned income generated by entertainer's services because it was responsible for all concert and
promotional arrangements).
-- 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1255 (1971), afj'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d
Cir. 1972).
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efficient method of allocation available under section 482.90 The court
of appeals relied on Fox and Laughton in finding those doctrines
inapplicable. 9 '
The impact of the Second Circuit's holding was not initially
apparent. The Tax Court continued to employ the doctrine to tax the
individual employee as the true earner when the cases were not appealable to the Second Circuit. In American Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 2 the Tax Court distinguished the holding in Rubin II and
applied the assignment of income doctrine to tax two individuals on
income collected by a PSC they had established to render management services to a controlled savings bank. 93 The Tax Court reasoned
that the circumstances present in American Savings Bank were distinguishable from those existing in Fox and Laughton. 94 Since the Second
Circuit in Rubin II had relied on these cases in holding the assignment
of income doctrine inapplicable, the American Savings Bank court
concluded that they were not precluded from applying assignment of
income principles.9 5 Contrary to the situations in Fox and Laughton,
where the individuals were contractually bound to render services
exclusively to their employer-corporations, the individuals involved in
American Savings Bank were not employed as agents or otherwise by
their PSC, which had collected all the income they had generated
performing services under contracts into which it had entered.9" Under applicable assignment of income principles, the court considered
two factors-dual control and the absence of an exclusive employment agreement-and determined that the individuals had complete
control over the earnings of management fees and accordingly were
97
taxable as the true earners.
The impact of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Foglesong v.
Commissioner (Foglesong 1H)98 was undoubtedly more significant. In
Foglesong II, the taxpayer, who engaged in business as a sales repre-

90

Id. at 654. The court found the PSC's employees control over the serviced corporation and

the absence of an exclusive employment contract to be irrelevant to the determination of who
earned the income, Id.
Of Id.
-2 56 T.C. 828 (1971).
93

Id.

Id. at 841.
11 See id. at 842-43.
"I Id. at 841-42.
97 Id.
-- 621 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691
F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
94
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sentative, formed a PSC to which he assigned all of his contract rights
and then substituted as the responsible party through a valid novation. 9 The court of appeals reversed the holding of the Tax Court in
Foglesong v. Commissioner (Foglesong1)100 which had reallocated the
income of the PSC to its controlling employee under the assignment of
income doctrine. The Tax Court had determined that tax avoidance
motives far outweighed any legitimate business purpose the taxpayer
may have had for incorporating. The court therefore applied assignment of income principles to readjust the taxpayer's income.' 0' The
Seventh Circuit found it inappropriate to determine the applicability
of the assignment of income doctrine by weighing " 'business purposes' against 'tax avoidance motives.' "102 The court reasoned that in
the present case it was improper to utilize assignment of income
principles to, in effect, ignore the existence of the corporation for tax
purposes when the corporation was not a sham, but a viable taxable
entity recognized as valid under the standard established in Moline
Properties and National Carbide.0 3 The court of appeals distinguished the Tax Court's assignment of income application in Rubin
1.104 The Seventh Circuit found that, contrary to the situation in
Rubin I, Foglesong worked exclusively for his PSC and did not exercise control over the entities to which services were rendered. 0 5 The
court concluded that far more extreme circumstances would have to
exist before assignment of income principles would be utilized to
essentially disregard the corporation as a "sham." 06

" Id. at 870. Thus, the PSC became "the sole party obligated to perform sale services and
entitled to be compensated for such performance." Id.
'00 Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1976), rev'd and remanded, 621
F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848
(7th Cir. 1982),
101Id. at 1313.
10 621 F.2d at 869.
103

Id.

101Id. at 870.
"I Id. at 871. Although there was no written employment agreement between Foglesong and
his controlled PSC, the Seventh Circuit determined that the only business activity he engaged in
was as an employee of the corporation. Id. at 567. The court found this fact to be far more
significant than a "paper obligation" that the Tax Court had emphasized as an important
consideration. Id. at 872.
100Id. at 869.
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After Foglesong II, the future utility of the assignment of income
doctrine in the PSC context appeared to be minimal at best.107 In
Keller v. Commissioner,10 8 the Tax Court illustrated the future role of
the doctrine in the PSC setting. In Keller, a taxpayer formed a professional corporation for the purpose of exploiting favorable corporate
welfare plans.10 Keller agreed to render services for the corporation
after substituting his PSC as partnership member of a partnership of
pathologists.110 The Tax Court ruled that assignment of income principles were inapplicable to reallocate corporate income because the
PSC carried on the business activity of the corporation through an
employment relationship with Keller that was respected by both parties as real and not illusory.' The court did determine, however, that
the doctrine was applicable to reallocate income collected by the PSC
which had been earned through services of Keller prior to the time the
corporation was substituted as the party responsible for the service
contracts. 1 2 The court therefore recognized that the assignment of
income doctrine may be utilized against a corporation that "is not
respected by the taxpayer/shareholders as a separate entity which
carries on business activities," as well as against those viable corporations whose income has been anticipatorily assigned to it in violation
3
of the prohibition of Lucas v. Earl.1

One author predicted that the doctrine would no longer be used by the courts in PSC cases
if the decisions in the Second and Seventh Circuits were followed. Burdett, supra note 11, at 332;
cJ. Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982) (Tax Court declined to apply doctrine supporting its conclusion by finding corporation to have exercised control over earning of income).
1o 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. 1982).
1o Id. at 1016.
107

l"0 Id. at 1017.
"I See id. at 1030-32. The Commissioner had argued that the PSC's failure to pay rent, own
property, employ other individuals to render services, incur indebtedness, pay interest, or loan
money indicated that the corporation did not operate the business. Id. at 1031. The Tax Court
disagreed, emphasizing that a legitimate employment relationship was established through
which the corporation was operated. The failure of the PSC to engage in incidental business
activities was not dispositive since the corporation conducted its medical practice in cooperation
with another corporation which supplied these services making it unnecessary for the PSC to
carry them out itself. See id. at 1032.
112 Id. at 1033. The court had already reallocated this income to Keller under a § 482 analysis,
and noted that the assignment of income doctrine would yield the same result. Id. at 1029.
"3 Id. at 1033. Judge Wilbur sided with the Commissioner and determined that the PSC was
nothing more than a "corporate shell" to which Keller assigned his entire income. See id. at 1036

1983]

COMMENT

Following Keller, the Tax Court in Johnson v. Commissioner"'
refined the scope of the assignment of income doctrine by developing
an objective standard of corporate control over earnings. In Johnson,
a professional basketball player assigned his contract rights to compensation from his professional team to his PSC in exchange for a
designated salary pursuant to a contract of employment he executed
with the corporation."15 The taxpayer's professional team acknowledged this contract and remitted all compensation due under it to the
PSC. 16 Although the corporation acquired the rights to Johnson's
services, it neither negotiated nor entered into a contract itself with
7
the professional teams to which its employee rendered services. "1
The Tax Court, under the Lucas v. Earl assignment of income
doctrine, held Johnson taxable on all the PSC's income received as
compensation for services he had personally rendered. "8 Relying on
the "true earner" concept, the court established a two-part test to
determine whether the corporation retained sufficient control over the
earning of income."19 First, the corporation must retain actual control
over the taxpayer through an employer-employee relationship.120 Sec-

(Wilbur, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that scrutinization under the assignment of
income doctrine could now be avoided through the respect of a minimum of corporate formalities even though the corporation would lack true substance. See id. Judge Wilbur feared the
implications of the majority's holding which reduced the role of assignment of income to a
secondary position. The dissent was apprehensive that a partnership of corporations structure
could be established whereby each corporate partner could arrange its corporate benefit plans to
fit the specific needs of the owner-employee without concern for the other partnership employees. See id. at 1039-45 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). The corporation would have no substantive
purpose other than to funnel income through corporate structure transferring the income into
nontaxable corporate benefits. Additionally, the PSC would retain no control over its operations
since the partnership structure would dominate. See id.
The major concern of the dissent, however, was remedied by the enactment of TEFRA.
TEFRA foreclosed the potential for abuse of corporate benefit plans by eliminating their
favorable status. Moreover, § 269A effectively nullified the utility of the partnership of corporations structure. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
" 78 T.C. 882 (1982).
Is Id. at 886. The agreement was subsequently amended to increase the amount of monthly
salary payments to allow for loan arrangements and to extend the term of the contract. Id. at
887.
I'l Id. at 886.
11
Id. at 893. In fact, the taxpayer's professional teams refused to enter into contracts with the
PSC. Id.
Id. at 893-94.
Il at 891.
Id,
120Id.
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ond, the corporation must be recognized by those entities it transacts
with as the party in control of the services it rendered.' 2 ' In applying
the test, the Tax Court determined that even if the PSC could meet
the first requirement, it would fail to satisfy the second because
Johnson, rather than the corporation, remained the party responsible
for the contracts with the professional teams. 122 The fact that contract
rights were assigned to the PSC merely indicated to the court that the
taxpayer was contractually bound to assign his income. It did not
evidence, however, that control was relinquished over the earning of
income. 123
EVOLUTION OF SECTION

482

As the use of common law doctrines to scrutinize the corporate
structure of the PSC began to fall into disfavor with many courts,
section 482 developed as the primary substitute in the arsenal of the
IRS. Section 482 authorizes the Commissioner to make adjustments in
the taxable incomes of "two or more organizations, trades, or businesses" which are commonly owned or controlled for the purpose of
"prevent(ing] evasion of taxes or clearly . . . reflect[ing] the income of
any such organizations, trades, or businesses."'' 24 These adjustments
may be undertaken through the "distribut[ion], apportion[ment], or
allocat[ion] [of] gross income, deductions, credits, or [other] allowances between" related entities.1 25 The Commissioner has broad dis-

IId. This control would ordinarily be acknowledged by contractual relations between the
controlling corporation and the entity for which the services are performed. Id.
22 Id. at 892. This first requirement was accepted arguendo although the Commissioner
contended the PSC maintained no control over the taxpayer because their contract relationship
was continually disregarded. Id.
123 Id. at 893. The Tax Court's attempt to define the scope of the assignment of income
doctrine in the PSC area was consistent with the holding in Foglesong II. The absence of a
contractual relationship between the PSC and the entities to which it rendered services may have
been the kind of situation to which the Seventh Circuit was alluding when it referred to more
extreme circumstances that were necessary in order to permit the application of assignment of
income principles.
In Foglesong II, the Second Circuit listed the existence of a contractual arrangement
between the PSC and the serviced entity as an important factor in its determination to reject the
application of the assignment of income doctrine. 621 F.2d at 868. The significance of this factor
along with several others listed by the Foglesong II court in the determination of the true earner
of income has been disputed. Feuer, supra note 26, at 568.
124 I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
125 Id.
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cretion in making adjustments under section 482 and his determination can be overturned only by a clear showing that the readjustments
26
to income are "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious."
The purpose of section 482 is to equalize the tax treatment between taxable entities which are manipulated to suit the preferences
of the controlling party with those which remain substantially uncontrolled.' 27 Three separate conditions must be satisfied for the provision
to become operative. First, two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses must be shown to have been involved.12 Second, common
control or ownership over the related entities must be found. ' Third,
there must exist some distortion of income which the Commissioner
can correct through readjustments of the related taxpayers' incomes.
To determine the presence of income distortion, the transactions of
the controlled taxpayers are scrutinized under a standard requiring
130
arm's length dealings between two unrelated taxpayers.
Section 482 evolved from an early provision of the Revenue Act of
1918 which authorized the Service to require related individuals or
entities to file consolidated returns.13 1 The Commissioner's powers in
this area were subsequently limited to the making of adjustments in

Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 126 (1964), afJ'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1981).
128 Until recently, the determination of the existence of this requirement was the focus of the
128

majority of litigation when the section was utilized in the PSC setting. See, e.g., Borge v.
Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 973, reh'g denied, 396 U.S.
869 (1969); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th
Cir. 1982); Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), af'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d
Cir. 1972); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), afJ'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 US. 899 (1966).
2I The courts have been most receptive to finding this requirement satisfied, since indirect
ownership or control, which is sufficient under the statute, can be evidenced in a variety of ways.
See, e.g., B. Forman Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
934, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972) (two 50% shareholders acting in concert constitute
sufficient control over corporation for purposes of § 482); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114
(1964), alfd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966) (control of corporation
through beneficial ownership of stock of sons and as director and executive officer).
130 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(2) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3) (1969) defines an arm's
length charge for services as an 'amount which was charged or would have been charged for the
same or similar services in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under
similar circumstances considering all relevant facts." Under Treas, Reg. § 1.482-2, T.D. 6954,
T.D. 7170, T.D. 7394, T.D. 7747, transactions of the controlling taxpayer that are examined
under § 482 involve loans or advances, rendition of services, and the use or transfer of both
tangible and intangible property.
"I' Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 200, 40 Stat. 1057.
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the accounts of these related taxpayers by the Revenue Act of 1921.132
The statutory evolution of section 482 was essentially complete when
the Revenue Act of 1928 granted the Commissioner the authority to
adjust through distributions, apportionments, or allocations, both income and deductions between similarly controlled taxpaying entities. 133 The provision has remained basically identical to the early
statutes, subject only to a few minor amendments over the past half
34
century. 1
Initially, the most prolific application of section 482 resided in
the area of foreign operations. Congress sought, through threat of
reallocation under section 482, to control transactions between domestic businesses and their foreign affiliates. 35 The application of the
section was thereafter extended in an effort to control many instances
of income distortion between related domestic business entities. 3 The
extension of section 482 to control the evasion or avoidance by an
individual and its controlled PSC was not explicitly sanctioned by the
legislative history of the provision. 31 In fact, there has been no legislative viewpoint whatsoever enunciated on section 482's recent judicial
application to the PSC setting. 38 Nevertheless, the provision's application in this area was established long before both the Second Circuit in
Rubin II and the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong II declared their pref39
erence for its utilization.

The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 40 Stat. 260, provided that:
in any case of two or more related trades or businesses . . . owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Commissioner may consolidate the
accounts of such related trades and businesses, in any proper case, for the purpose of
making an accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deductions, or capital between or among related trades or businesses.
1 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 695.
131 The Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 45, 48 Stat. 695, added "organization" to the trades or
businesses requirement. The Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 129(b), 58 Stat. 48, added, "credits
and allowances," as adjustments that could be made under § 482's predecessor.
135 H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1921).
"I See Seieroe & Gerber, Section 482-Still Growing at the Age of 50, 46 TAXES 893, 894
(1968).
137 See Comment, supra note 5, at 156.
131 Id. at 157.
131 The Tax Court had accepted § 482's application against the PSC in several cases before the
1970 and 1980 circuit court decisions were handed down. See, e.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 979 (1966), modified, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g
denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
132

1983]

COMMENT

The Tax Court introduced section 482 as a formidable weapon of
the IRS against the PSC in Ach v. Commissioner.140 In Ach, the
operator of a successful retail dress and apparel business became the
controlling officer and director of a previously unprofitable dairy
corporation formerly owned by her son. ' 4 The corporation thereupon
altered its incorporation purpose after ceasing its dairy operations,
and continued the business of the taxpayer.142 The corporation then
made payments to Mrs. Ach for the purchase of her business assets and
also for the repayment of debt to the taxpayer on loans that had been
made to the dairy corporation by her deceased husband. 43 The income of the corporation was offset by carryover losses from the dairy
business. 44
Although the Tax Court recognized the validity of the corporation, it applied section 482 and allocated seventy percent of the PSC's
income to Ach because it determined that amount to be attributable
to her contribution to the corporation through the management services she rendered. 45 Section 482's "two organizations, trades, or businesses" requirement was satisfied solely by reference to the corporation and the taxpayer even though Ach participated in no business
activities other than those management services performed for the
corporation. 46 Since Ach was said to have retained the principal asset
of the business-her participation and management-the Tax Court
determined that "sufficient aspects of the business remained with [the
taxpayer] so as not to deprive her of the status of a separate 'organization', 'trade', or 'business' within the meaning of section 482."47
42 T.C. 114, afJ'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
Id. at 117-18. The taxpayer did not own shares in the corporation. The record owners were
her two sons: Roger, the original owner of the dairy corporation and Lawrence, to whom Roger
transferred 149 of the 300 outstanding shares. Id. at 117.
142 Id. The stated purpose of the corporation was changed to a general purpose in order to
allow it to participate in a variety of businesses. Id. The corporation, in addition to conducting
the retail business, continued to rent the remaining unsold assets of the former dairy business. Id.
at 119.
141 Id. The taxpayer received payments upon the notes of her deceased husband which she
succeeded to as sole beneficiary of his estate. Id.
14 Id. at 121. The corporation reported no income tax for the years in question. Id.
"I Id. at 127. The Tax Court found the corporation responsible for generating the other 30%
of its income since the PSC owned the assets of the business and employed nine to 12 employees
who assisted the corporation through the performance of services. Id. at 126-27.
146 Id. at 124-25.
141 Id. The absence of an employment contract between Ach and the corporation, and the fact
that Ach received no compensation for the management services she rendered to the corporation
were factors contributing to the Tax Court's determination that Ach retained her status as a
separate business. The court reasoned that since the corporation did not receive the rights to
Ach's services, the taxpayer remained in a position where she could have transferred her services
at any time to a competing entity, thereby rendering the retail business of the corporation
valueless. Id. at 124-25.
140
141
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The court had less trouble satisfying section 482's two remaining
requirements, common control and income distortion. Although the
taxpayer did not hold record ownership of the PSC, the control requirement was satisfied because Ach had become the controlling officer and director of the corporation and was interpreted to be the
beneficial owner of her son's corporate interest. 48 A distortion of
income was perceived by the Tax Court after an analysis of the true
substance of the transactions between Ach and her controlled PSC.
The court deduced that the principal purpose of the transfer of assets
to the corporation was to avoid the payment of taxes by utilizing
otherwise worthless losses and debts of the prior dairy business to
offset, through deductions, current income earned by the retail dress
business. 49 When this was coupled with the fact that the transfer of
assets to the corporation was consummated for much less than its
actual value and without including the rights to the services of the
taxpayer, it was not difficult for the court to hold that these transactions fell far short of the arm's length standard by which they are
judged under section 482.15
Although the blatant tax avoidance motives involved in Ach may
have resulted in the sympathetic attitude of the court toward the IRS
in the application of section 482, the expansive interpretation of the
"two organizations, trades, or businesses" requirement was eventually
to have a marked impact on the development of the provision in the
PSC area. The significance of the Tax Court's interpretation of the
dual business requirement became more apparent in Borge v. Commissioner.a15 In Borge, the taxpayer formed a PSC, Danica Enterprises, Inc. (Danica), which continued an unsuccessful poultry farm
business that had incurred substantial losses over its previous four
years of operation. 1 2 Thereafter, Borge entered into an employment
agreement with the corporation under which he was to perform enter141 Id. at 125. The fact that Ach's two shareholder sons took no active role in the affairs of the
corporation and later transferred their interests to Ach for no consideration indicated that record
ownership had no bearing on control. In any event, the court ruled that 'actual control," and
not formal ownership was the determinative factor. Id.
"I Id. at 123.
150 Id.
5 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
'-1 Id. at 674. The corporation was organized to avoid the unfavorable tax consequences
which would have resulted from an application of I.R.C. § 270 (West Supp. 1964) (repealed
1969). Section 270, the predecessor of the current "hobby loss" provision, I.R.C. § 183 (1976),
would have denied Borge a deduction on his poultry business' fifth consecutive year's losses in
excess of $50,000. The corporation he formed was not subject to the provision because § 270 was
applicable only to trades or businesses. See 405 F.2d at 674-75.
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tainment and promotional services over a period of five years at a
stated salary of $50,000 per year. 53 The corporation continued to
incur losses from its poultry farming, but offset these losses against
income generated from Borge's entertainment services that had not
been paid out to him as salary. 5 4 The Second Circuit upheld the Tax
Court's application of section 482 to readjust Borge's compensation to
reflect an arm's length portion of the net income of the PSC that
should have been paid to him based on the value of his contribution of
services.'

55

The court of appeals based its application of section 482 on its
finding of two separate controlled businesses within the corporate
5
structure-the poultry business and the entertainment business.
The third requirement of section 482 was satisfied when the court
57
determined that the taxpayer was substantially undercompensated.1
Accordingly, the court approved the Commissioner's reallocation of
an additional $25,000 per year of corporate income to Borge in order
' 58
to "clearly reflect the income of the two businesses."'
The Second Circuit in Borge relied heavily upon the Tax Court's
determination that the dual business requirement had been met. 15
Similar to the Ach Tax Court, the Borge court emphasized the existence of tax avoidance motives involved in Borge's corporate transactions. 16 0 Although an improper tax purpose was not explicitly declared

"3405 F.2d

at 675.

154 Id.
"I Id. at 674, The circuit court also affirmed the Tax Court's disallowance of the corporation's carryover loss deductions under § 269. Id. The court was not dissuaded from applying §
482 merely because other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code had been provided to control
the corporate transactions of the PSC under examination. The court of appeals cited National
Sees Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943) which
supported the application of the section even if in apparent conflict with another Internal
Revenue Code provision. 405 F.2d at 677.
"1 405 F.2d at 675-76. Findings of the Tax Court which influenced this determination
included: Borge's personal operation of the entertainment business; the absence of any participation in the entertainment business by the corporation; and the failure of the PSC to pay a
substantial amount of the entertainment earnings to Borge as compensation. Id.
I" See id. at 677. This conclusion was based on the fact that the earnings of the corporation,
which were solely attributable to the entertainment services performed by Borge rather than to
any undertaking by the PSC itself, were substantially retained by the corporation to be offset

against losses generated by the poultry business. Id.
158 Id. at 677. The Second Circuit found the adjustment generous in view of the fact that
Borge's entertainment services generated over $166,000. Id.
"I Id. at 677.
1'1See id. The tax avoidance scheme involved the undercompensation of Borge in order to
offset losses of an unrelated business. See id.

146
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relevant to the section 482 analysis, the taxpayer's motives undoubtedly contributed to the Seventh Circuit's willingness to apply the

section.

161

The Borge court's reliance on Ach led to much speculation that
section 482 would become a potentially unlimited weapon of the IRS
against the PSC structure.16 2 A fear arose that the controlling employee of a PSC would be subject to income reallocation whenever it
was determined by the Commissioner that his compensation was insufficient.1 63 The Tax Court's decision in Rubin v. Commissioner
(Rubin 111)164 did nothing to allay this fear.
On remand from the Second Circuit for a reallocation determination under section 482, the Tax Court held the section applicable to
readjust the income of a PSC's employee to reflect a greater percentage of the corporation's net income.16 5 The Rubin III court supported
the use of assignment of income principles as the primary indicator
whether two separate organizations, trades, or businesses could be

"ISee id. at 675.

The Second Circuit was not influenced by the taxpayer's reliance on the

United States Supreme Court decision in Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963). In
Whipple, the Court held that an individual would not be treated as a separate business merely
because services were rendered to a corporation in order to promote an investment. Id. at 202.
The taxpayer in Whipple was attempting to establish his status as a separate trade or business in
order to take advantage of a potential business bad debt deduction from personal loans to his
corporation which had become worthless. See id. The Supreme Court noted:
Devoting one's time and energies to the affairs of the corporation is not of itself, and
without more, a trade or business of the person so engaged. Though such activities
may produce income, profit or gain in the form of dividends or enhancement in the
value of an investment, this return is distinctive to the process of investing and is
generated by the successful operation of the corporation's business as distinguished
from the trade or business of the taxpayer himself.
Id.
The Second Circuit distinguished Whipple and emphasized that Borge did more than
devote his services to the success of the corporation as an investment. The court ruled that he
actually continued his entertainment career and funnelled the income through his controlled
PSC. 405 F.2d at 676.
162 See Aland, Section 482: 1971 Version, 49 TAXES 815, 848 (1971); Fuller, Section 482
Revisited, 31 TAX L. REv. 475, 480-81 (1976); Seieroe & Gerber, supra note 136, at 895-97.
A good argument could be made that the Second Circuit's approval of Ach was not
justifiable. See Seieroe & Gerber, supra note 136, at 897. The services rendered by the taxpayer
in Ach, which were essentially those of an employee, could have been distinguished from Borge's
activity which was found to constitute an entertainment business in itself, since he personally
controlled all aspects of its operation. See id.
163 See Bailey, supra note 5, at 657-68.
'
56 T.C. 1155 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
16I Id. Rubin had organized a management service corporation under which he performed
services to a business he later gained control over. Rubin performed all the management services,
but received only a portion of the earnings as compensation. Id.
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found within the structure of a PSC."' Since Rubin had neglected to
enter into an exclusive employment arrangement with his PSC, and
since he also controlled the entity which he serviced, the court determined that he had retained sufficient control over his services to
7
constitute a separate trade or business apart from the corporation.1
The court, however, stopped short of holding that the status of an
employee itself constitutes a separate trade or business, ruling that a
corporate employee may be treated in this manner only if it is established that the employee has failed to relinquish sufficient control over
his services to the corporation.1 8
The Rubin III court's application of section 482, subsequently
affirmed on appeal by the Second Circuit,"' was a potentially greater
threat to the PSC status than its application in both Ach and Borge.
Although each of those courts had applied an expansive interpretation
of the dual business requirement, the Rubin III court's reallocation
could not be justified by the existence of the tax avoidance motives
70
which were present in the factual settings of both Ach and Borge.1
The Tax Court determined that control over the earning of income
was the principal standard utilized to determine whether two distinct
trades or businesses existed within the corporate structure. Consequently, the controlling owner-employee of a PSC could have been
potentially subject to a section 482 reallocation in every situation
where the Service perceived that the employee failed to be compensated at an arm's length rate. "7

816Id. at 1162. The Tax Court placed much reliance on both its decision in Ach and the

Second Circuit's decision in Borge. Id. at 1157.
I'7 See id. at 1156-60. The court reasoned that the control Rubin exercised over his services
would allow him to deny the corporation his employment at any time. Id. at 1160.
8I See id. at 1161. If the employee retains control over his services, then he controls the
earning of income and therefore can be said to be operating a separate business apart from his
controlled corporation. See 56 T.C. 1155.
Evidence of multiple shareholders investing substantial capital into the corporation, multiple employees, and other factors which tend to illustrate the existence of additional contributions
to the earning of corporate income, were relevant only to the determination of the proper
amount to be allocated and did not demonstrate the inappropriateness of § 482's application. Id.
at 1160.
18 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
'10 In both Ach and Borge, the corporate structure was utilized to offset income through losses
of another business. In Rubin, income was shifted from the individual taxpayer to his controlled
PSC by undercompensating him for the services he rendered to the corporation.
171 See Bailey, supra note 5, at 659. The Tax Court in Rubin, however, insisted that a showing
of more than employee status was necessary to find a separate trade or business. See 56 T.C. at
1161.
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The expected unlimited utilization of section 482 against the PSC
form did not immediately materialize. When a case was not appealable to the Second Circuit, the Tax Court continued to apply common
law principles as primary weapons rather than as preliminary determinations before reallocation under section 482.172 The Tax Court was
cognizant of the possibility that a section 482 analysis would be preferred by a higher court and therefore it sometimes supported its
assignment of income applications by reaching identical results under
section 482.17 At other times, Rubin III would be followed and the
transactions of a PSC and its owner-employee would be scrutinized
solely through an analysis under section 482.174
The next influential case in the PSC area decided by the Seventh
Circuit, Foglesong v. Commissioner (Foglesong II),175 supported the
Second Circuit's declared preference for analysis under section 482. In
Foglesong II, the taxpayer formed a PSC and performed all its services

12

See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), rev'd and re-

manded, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded,
691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Shaw v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 375 (1972); American Savings
Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971).
113 Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975) (taxpayer reallocated income of his controlled
corporation under both common law and § 482 analyses).
"I See, e.g., Jordan v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 872 (1973) where the Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner's reallocation of corporate income and deductions to the controlling employee of a
PSC, finding the activities of the taxpayer sufficient to constitute a separate and distinct business
apart from the corporation. See id. at 882-83. Jordan had formed a PSC for the purpose of
rendering management services to his controlled insurance companies. Id. at 878. The management company, which was entirely owned and controlled by the taxpayer, contracted with these
insurance companies itself, but Jordan performed all the services under the contracts either
directly or through a "management group" composed of employees from other related companies
who were not considered in the employ of the PSC. Id. The court determined that the PSC failed
to retain sufficient control over its earnings primarily because Jordan performed all of its services
in the absence of an employment contract binding him to work exclusively for the PSC. Id. at
883.
The Eighth Circuit attempted to clarify the muddled distinctions between the applicability
of § 482 and common law doctrines in the PSC setting in Wilson v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 772
(8th Cir. 1976). The court ruled that assignment of income principles would be applied to
correct income distortion between a PSC and its controlling-employee whether or not the
corporation was determined to be a sham, since it was possible to assign income to a viable
corporation for the purpose of avoiding taxes. Id. at 778. On the other hand, if § 482's
requirements were satisfied, that provision could be utilized to correct income distortion in the
PSC area. The Eighth Circuit identified two factors as significant in the determination of
whether the employee constituted a separate business apart from the business of the corporation.
The first involved an interpretation of who the serviced entity actually looked to to perform the
services for which it contracted. The second was a consideration of the number of individuals
that contributed to the performance of services. Id. at 777.
17
621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691
F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
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under contracts he had assigned to it through a valid novation. 176 The
court of appeals determined that section 482 was the appropriate
remedy to readjust income between a PSC and its controlling employee absent extreme circumstances of domination by the employee, 71 7 but did not clearly define the parameters of the application
of the provision. The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the Tax
Court's allocation under the Lucas v. Earl assignment of income
doctrine and remanded the case back for an analysis under section
482.178 Before the Tax Court rendered a final decision in Foglesong III
it decided another significant case in which it extended the scope of
section 482 beyond that of Rubin III.
In Keller v. Commissioner,179 a pathologist, after joining a professional association as a partner, formed a PSC which he substituted
as the partnership member.180 Keller contracted with the PSC to
render services in exchange for compensation which consisted of salary
and several corporate welfare plan benefits.' 8 ' Although the Keller
court held section 482 applicable to correct the existing income distortion, it rejected the Service's reallocation of the PSC's entire income to
the controlling employee. 182 The Tax Court determined that the compensation paid to Keller by the corporation was sufficient to meet the
"arm's length" standard of section 482 because it was substantially
equivalent to that which he would have bargained for absent his
status as controlling shareholder. 18 3 Since corporate welfare benefits
were included within the compensation analysis, substantial disparity
did not exist between the expected, bargained for compensation and
Keller's actual compensation. Therefore, the Tax Court found Keller's
compensation represented an arm's length amount sufficient to render
section 482 inapplicable to readjust the majority of the corporation's
84
income. 1

Id. at 870.
See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
"I See 621 F.2d at 869-73; supra notes 68-123 for a discussion of the assignment of income
171
177

doctrine.
17- 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed. No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. 1982).
11o Id. at 1016-17.

" Id. The welfare plans consisted of a medical reimbursement plan, an employee wage
continuation plan, and a pension plan. Id.
112 Id. at 1024-25. The court approved only of the reallocation of that income of the corporation which Keller had acquired rights to before incorporation. Id. at 1027.
183 Id. at 1028-29; see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3).
18 77 T.C. at 1028-29.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:121

Although today both income and allowances of Keller's con18 5
trolled PSC would be reallocated back to him under section 269A,
the holding in Keller was significant because it represented the Tax
Court's initial determination that employee status alone could constitute a separate trade or business for purposes of section 482.186 The
Keller court ruled that the dual business requirement of section 482
was satisfied solely by the PSC and its controlling employee. 187 The
Tax Court justified its extension of section 482 by emphasizing the
blatant "artificiality" of the existing corporate structure which it was
forced to recognize pursuant to the policy adopted by the Supreme
88 The court apparently
Court in Moline Properties.1
believed that its
recognition of this policy dictated that section 482 be employed to its
broadest degree in order to adequately combat tax avoidance in the
PSC setting by controlling the shifting or manipulating of income and
9
allowances between a taxpayer and his related entity.18
When the Seventh Circuit remanded Foglesong II for consideration under section 482, there were renewed fears among commentators that the provision would be used to prematurely end the usefulness of the PSC structure. 9 0 It had been ten years since the Second
Circuit had expanded the scope of section 482 through its broad
interpretation of the section's applicability, and for the first time since
Rubin II, another court had supported its reasoning. In Keller, the
Tax Court accomplished the feared result when it held employee
status sufficient to constitute a separate trade or business under section
482.'1 The Tax Court, however, declined to exploit the broad reach
of the provision to nullify the viability of the PSC structure. Rather,
the court sanctioned the use of the corporate form to take advantage
of benefits from favorable corporate welfare plans.19 2 The manipula-

"'-

See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.

186 77 T.C. at 1028-29; see also Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982); Achiro v.

Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981).
I'l 77 T.C. at 1028-29. The Tax Court reasoned that the pathologist practice was operated at
two distinct levels. The corporate level consisted of the business of the PSC which employed the
taxpayers to render its partnership services. Id. at 1024. Keller himself was said to have operated
the medical practice on the employee level and therefore constituted "the business of providing
services as an employee of his wholly owned corporation." Id. As support for this proposition, the
court cited Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970) which held employee status sufficient
to constitute a trade or business under § 162(a). 77 T.C. at 1024.
18877 T.C. at 1024; see also Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1, C.B. 278.
189 See 77 T.C. at 1024.

j1o See Burdett, supra note 11.
'll 77 T.C. at 1023-24.
191 Id. at 1028-32.
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tion of income through transformation of corporate income into nonwas, according to one commentator, not to be intertaxable benefits
93
fered with. 1
This policy was not challenged by the Tax Court's decision on
remand in Foglesong III. 114 The court confirmed the view that a PSC
and its controlling employee would satisfy the first requirement of
section 482 and supported this determination by citing both congressional house reports and treasury tax regulations. 9 5 Unlike Keller,
however, the Tax Court held that a large readjustment of Foglesong's
income was necessary to correct an existing income distortion. 9 6 The
court held that an "arm's length" amount should be allocated to
Foglesong in order "to clearly reflect the income of the taxpayer"
because his compensation was substantially less than the income he
97
would have received absent incorporation.1
The Foglesong III court distinguished incorporation for the purpose of utilizing statutorily provided corporate tax benefits, and incorporation for the purpose of improperly shifting income away from its
true earner. 9 8 In conclusion, however, the Tax Court gave assurance
that it would not attempt to discourage the use of the corporate form
when the incorporation purpose was sanctioned by congressional enactment. 199

193

Bailey, supra note 5, at 665.

77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
115Id. at 1104. Both the house report, H. R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934), and
the treasury regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1, called for a broad reading of the trade or business
requirement which was intended to encompass "all kinds of business activity."
194

"1 77 T.C. at 1105-06.
117 See id. at 1106. No corporate

welfare benefits were received by the taxpayer as compensation. Id. Implicit in the court's holding was its recognition of the fact that the manipulation of
income present in the instant case went far beyond the use of the corporate structure to take
advantage of favorable corporate welfare plans. See id.
"'
See id. at 1105-06.
'
Id. at 1106. It was then noted by one commentator that § 482 could now be used to
enhance the viability of the PSC by avoiding the harsh results of the application of common law
doctrines. See Bailey, supra note 5, at 667.
Since common law doctrines would become inapplicable upon an analysis by the court
under § 482, the PSC would be shielded from multiple attacks by the IRS on its corporate status
if the provisions of § 482 were applied. Both Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 872 (2d
Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1031 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir.
1982), ruled that attempts to reallocate the entire income of a corporation under common law
principles, where a reallocation analysis under § 482 failed to uncover the existence of income
distortion, would be inappropriate as mere attempts to disregard the court's initial determination
that the PSC was a viable entity.
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IMPACT OF FOGLESONG IV

In the aftermath of Keller, it was obvious that the scope of
section 482 had undergone a dramatic growth process since its initial
introduction to the PSC setting two decades earlier in Ach. Not only
had the provision supplanted the traditional common law doctrines as
the primary method of correcting income distortion between a PSC
and its controlling employee, but its expansive application had ne200
gated any need for additional means of attack on the PSC structure.
Absent extreme circumstances of domination by the controlling employee over the business operations of the corporation or an anticipatory assignment of income, courts were no longer willing to scrutinize
20 1
transactions of the PSC under traditional common law doctrines.
Several justifications have been espoused by the circuit courts
regarding their declared preference for analysis under section 482.
Three of these justifications were enumerated by the Second Circuit in
Rubin 11. 2'2 The court reasoned that by utilizing section 482 rather
than assignment of income principles, the unyielding "all-or-nothing
approach" could be systematically avoided. 20 3 The court of appeals
recognized that an assignment of income analysis often required a
court to readjust substantially all of the PSC's net income once it
found that the corporation was not the true earner. 20 4 Additionally,
the Second Circuit found that analysis under section 482 would better
resolve the conflict between the tax policy favoring recognition of
corporate status, and the policy promoting the effectiveness of graduated tax rates, by requiring income to be reallocated to the true earner
only upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. 20 5 Lastly, the Rubin II
court recognized that through the availability of section 482's relief

200 If income distortion was perceived within the transactions between a PSC and its controlling employee, § 482's expansive interpretation made it available to reallocate income back to its
true earner in essentially every case. See supra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
201 See Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102
(1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d
650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), afJ'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
202 429 F.2d at 653-54.

201 Id. at 653.
204 See Bailey, supra note 5. If an employee was the actual income earner that corporate
income attributable to the services he rendered would have to be reallocated to that employee
under the assignment of income doctrine.
2os 429 F.2d at 653.
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procedures, the taxpayer whose income was readjusted would be
protected from additional penalties that may have resulted from allo20 6
cation under common law doctrines.
The Seventh Circuit, in Foglesong II, agreed that analysis under
common law principles should be avoided in all but extreme cases,
and recommended section 482 because of its ability to command a
more exacting adjustment than the "sledgehammer" approach fostered by the principles of assignment of income or substance over
form.20 7 In addition, the Foglesong II court, bolstered by the support
of Rubin II, ruled that an assignment of income adjustment, which
reallocates substantially all of the PSC's net income to the controlling
employee, would essentially prove contrary to the court's initial determination that the PSC carried on business activity as a viable entity. 20
In response to the direction of the two circuit courts, the Tax
Court in FoglesongIII made certain that section 482 would be applied
in a manner broad enough to reach most instances of income distortion found in the PSC setting. 20 9 As a consequence of this newly
developed judicial trend, whereby the closely held PSC would automatically qualify for examination under section 482, the focus of
litigation under the provision shifted from one principally concerned
with satisfying the dual business requirement to an analysis involving
solely a determination of the existence of income distortion within the
PSC structure. 210 In extending the scope of the dual business element,
the Foglesong III Tax Court had relied upon a 1934 congressional

206Id. at 653-54. In other words, while an additional distribution tax on dividends may be
imposed upon a taxpayer who attempts to gain receipt of corporate income allocated to him
under the assignment of income doctrine, relief provisions would permit a taxpayer to gain
possession of § 482 reallocated income without becoming subject to dividend taxation.
207 621 F.2d at 872.

201Id. at 869. One commentator has criticized all five justifications enumerated by these two
courts. Feuer, supra note 17, at 569. First, he believed that a determination that an entity was
viable would not necessarily indicate that it could not have been assigned income. Second, the
use of assignment of income principles should not be exclusive. Third, neither § 482 nor its
regulations offered direction regarding the reconciliation of conflicting tax policies. Fourth,
Feuer believed it was difficult for the section to be accurate because the application of the
provision remains extremely complicated. Lastly, it was thought that the receipt of reallocated
income under the assignment of income doctrine would also be possible without additional
distribution taxation under relief allowances similar to those provided with § 482 adjustments.
Id.
209 Foglesong v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th
Cir. 1982); see also Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appealdocketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. 1982) (expanded the application of the section to cover all instances of income
distortion by a closely held PSC and its controlling employee).
2'0 See Bailey, supra note 5, at 661-67.
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report concerning the amendment of section 482's predecessor, section
45, which added the word "organization" to the two trades or businesses requirement. 21 The court had read the congressional committee report, which stated that the addition was designed to indicate
that the section applied to "all kinds of business activity," as support
for the proposition that employee status alone could constitute a sepa21 2
rate organization, trade, or business.
Much to the chagrin of the Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals was unwilling to acquiesce in this interpretation. In
Foglesong v. Commissioner (FoglesongIV)21 3 the Seventh Circuit held
section 482 inapplicable to reallocate income and allowances between
a PSC and its controlling employee based on the Commissioner's
21 4
failure to satisfy the provision's dual business requirement.
The Foglesong IV court designated the crucial issue to involve a
determination of whether the PSC and its controlling employee constituted two separate "organizations, trades, or businesses" under section
482.215 The factual setting in Foglesong IV was significant to the
court's resolution of this issue. The Seventh Circuit adopted the findings of fact from its first decision in Foglesong 11.216 The court of
appeals had originally found that Fredrick Foglesong, a sales representative, had incorporated his business and thereafter proceeded to
work exclusively for the corporation. 217 The Seventh Circuit had also
identified the following factors as significant: (1) the assignment of
Foglesong's contract rights to the corporation; (2) the substitution of
the PSC as the party responsible under these service agreements
through a valid novation; 21 8 (3) the ownership of ninety-eight percent
of the corporation's outstanding common stock by Foglesong; 2 9 (4)
the distribution of dividends only on preferred shares of the corporation which were held by Foglesong's two minor children; 220 (5) the
211 See Foglesong v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1102, 1104, rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848
(7th Cir. 1982).
212 See id. It appears that the Tax Court had presumed it was merely carrying forth the
original express intention of the legislature when it expanded the reach of § 482 to cover most
instances of income distortion in the PSC setting.
213 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
214 See id. at 853.
215 Id. at 850.
216

Id.

217 621 F.2d at 866-67.
211

Id. After incorporation, the PSC collected commissions that were earned by Foglesong

prior to its formation. Id. at 866.
211 See id. at 868.
220 Id. at 866.
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performance by Foglesong of substantially all the services under the
corporation's service contracts;2"2 ' (6) the receipt by Foglesong of
monthly salary payments, which amounted to substantially less than
that which he earned prior to incorporation or that which he would
222
have earned had he never incorporated his sales business.
After a consideration of the factual setting, the Seventh Circuit
traced the history and the use of section 482 in the PSC area. The
court determined that the provision was "intended to be broadly
interpreted" so that it may be capable of correcting income distortion
in those situations where profits were shifted to offset losses of an
unrelated business 223 and where a PSC employee acted as a separate
business apart from his corporate employer.2 24 The Foglesong IV court
ruled, however, that these two situations represented the limit of
section 482's applicability. The expansion of the provision by the
Keller court " 'to cover any type of entity or enterprise which has
independent tax significance' " was emphatically disapproved. 22 5 The
court of appeals disputed the Tax Court's broad reading of the applicability of section 482, finding its interpretation of the congressional
house report regarding the 1934 addition of "organization" to the
predecessor of section 482 to have been completely misconstrued. 226
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a reading of the phrase "all kinds of
business activity" in context would have revealed that the section was
not designed to encompass "all entities with independent tax significance." 227 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit developed a standard
whereby section 482 would be inapplicable to reallocate income between a PSC and its controlling employee where services were rendered by that employee exclusively on behalf of the corporation, and
where there existed no shifting of income between unrelated busi228
nesses for the purpose of avoiding or evading taxes.

222

See id. at 866-67.
See id.

223

691 F.2d at 850. The court cited Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), afjd, 358 F.2d

221

342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966) as support for this proposition.
224 691 F.2d at 850. The court cited Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 933, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969) as support for this proposition.
691 F.2d at 850-51 (citing Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1981), appeal
docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. 1982)).
121

220

Id. at 851.

Id. The court emphasized that if Congress had intended the scope of § 482 to encompass
"all entities with independent tax significance," they would have used that phrase rather than
merely the word "organization," Id.
228 Id. The court remarked that this new standard of § 482 would suffice to promote both the
objectives of the statute and the policy favoring recognition of "legitimate- personal service
corporations. Id.
221
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The Foglesong IV court proceeded to support its limited interpretation of the scope of section 482 by distinguishing the factual situations that existed in those earlier cases which had contributed to the
development of the provision's standard of applicability. The court
first examined Borge v. Commissioner and determined that the Second Circuit's application of section 482 was consistent with the newly
developed standard. 2 9 In Borge, the taxpayer had devoted only a
portion of his entertainment services to his controlled PSC and was
justifiably treated as a separate business apart from the corporation.2 30
Contrasting Ach with Foglesong IV, the Seventh Circuit emphasized
both Ach's retention of significant aspects of her former business and
the use of the corporate form to offset losses of an unrelated business.2 3 ' The Foglesong case was distinguishable because Foglesong had
established a legitimate employment relationship even though he had
failed to formally contract with his PSC.2 32 Additionally, Foglesong
did not utilize the PSC's profits to offset losses or other allowances
from another business. 233 Lastly, an analysis of Rubin v. Commissioner added reenforcement to the Seventh Circuit's holding. The
Foglesong IV court believed that the Rubin Tax Court had stressed the
significance of exclusivity of employment as the key to a determina2 34
tion of whether an employee constitutes a separate business.
The court of appeals concluded, therefore, that section 482 was
inapplicable to reallocate the PSC's income to Foglesong since Foglesong neither constituted a separate trade or business nor shifted profits
or losses between unrelated businesses. 23 5 Consequently, the court
reversed and remanded the case back to the Tax Court to consider
whether either the dividends distributed to the children or the commissions earned by Foglesong (but collected by the PSC subsequent to
its incorporation) should be taxed to Foglesong under common law
doctrines .236

See id. at 851-52.
See id. at 852. The court determined that Borge himself was running the entertainment
business and this was indicated by the fact that third parties required Borge to guarantee each of
the corporation's contracts. Id. The Foglesong situation was distinguishable because the taxpayer's business was one and the same with that of the corporation to which he rendered exclusive
services. Id.
231 Id.
231 See id.
233 Id.
231 See id.
13 See id. at 853.
236 Id.
221

210
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CONCLUSION

The recent judicial reenforcement of the tax policy favoring recognition of corporate status has enabled the corporate form to remain
a viable alternative to individuals in trades or businesses who would
ordinarily conduct their business outside the corporate structure. Consequently, the formation of a PSC has remained a suspect tax planning
practice in the eyes of the Service, particularly in those situations
where corporate benefits have accrued due solely to the exercise of
extreme control by the PSC's individual employee over the business
affairs of the corporation.

237

The methodology for scrutinizing transactions between PSCs and
their controlling employees has undergone a dramatic transformation
over the past two decades. Whereas traditional statutory challenges to
the PSC tax structure have retained their narrow focus, the interrelated IRS positions concerning section 482 and common law principles
have been subject to continual evolution. Initially, the Service utilized
both section 482 and common law doctrines in a complementary
fashion and thereby allowed their analyses to overlap to a great
extent. 238 In the absence of any specific guidance, the Tax Court
applied these IRS weapons to the PSC setting in a seemingly arbitrary
manner. 239
Thereafter, the Second Circuit triggered the expansive judicial use
of section 482 as the preferred method of reallocation in the PSC
area. 240 As a result, the "true earner" analysis under the assignment of
income doctrine, once the favored method of attack on the PSC
2137See

Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1025-26 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414

(10th Cir. 1982). The one-man PSC is the classic example of extreme control over the business
affairs of a corporation since it is difficult to distinguish between the actions of the corporation
and those of the employee.
211 For several Tax Court cases in which the service pressed both common law and § 482
arguments, see Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), revd and remanded, 621 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1182 (1981), rev'd and remanded,
691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975); Rubin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C.
1155 (1971), afJ'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
231 See, eg., American Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971) (assignment of
income doctrine rather than § 482 applied through stipulation of parties); Phillip Bros. Chems.
v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 240 (1969), aJf'd, 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970) (§ 482 applied rather
than substance-over-form doctrine to reallocate 100% of the corporation's income); Roubik v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365 (1969) (assignment of income doctrine applied rather than sham
doctrine in situation in which corporate formalities were never even respected).
11oRubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971),
aff'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
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structure, was relegated to a secondary position in the arsenal of the
IRS.2 41 After the Tax Court in Keller held that a closely held PSC
would automatically qualify for analysis under section 482, the assignment of income doctrine was limited to a role commensurate to that of
242
the sham corporation doctrine.
Today, courts employ a "business activity" analysis to determine
whether common law doctrines are applicable to readjust income of
the PSC. The business purpose or activity test, developed by the
Supreme Court in Moline Propertiesto verify corporate viability, has
become the primary indicator of the necessity for analysis under section 482. If the taxpayer can show the existence of either a legitimate
business purpose for incorporating or the carrying on of business
activity after incorporation, the Commissioner's remedy will be limited to reallocation under section 482.243
The business purpose argument has been of little utility to the
Internal Revenue Service. Not only may a satisfactory purpose be
evidenced by any legitimate reason termed equivalent to a business
activity, 244 but after Keller, tax saving motives may be sufficient in
and of themselves rather than detrimental to the taxpayer's cause. 245

I4 For a time, the doctrine became useful in the determination of the dual business requirement of § 482. See id.
242 See Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1030-31 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. 1982) where the Tax Court remarked that only a semantic difference remained
between a viability analysis and a true earner analysis under the assignment of income doctrine.
One commentator has suggested a PSC distortion of income analysis in which the role of
true earner principles remained far more significant. Feuer, supra note 17, at 566. The three-step
approach would begin first with a determination whether the corporation is viable. Id. If the
PSC was shown to be viable, it would then be determined whether the corporation earned the
income it collected from third parties to which services were rendered. Id. Even if the PSC
survives the first two determinations, § 482 would be available to reallocate an arm's length
amount of compensation to the controlling employee. Id. The focus of the analysis would
remain, however, on the true earner concept and § 482 would play only a supporting role.
243 See, e.g., Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. 1982); Archiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
881 (1981).
244 Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). Satisfactory purposes have
included the desire to limit liability and to expand the scope of business activity. See Foglesong v.
Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and
remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982). The desire to expand a law practice to include an
unlicensed employee was sufficient to constitute a valid business purpose in Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975).
245 See 77 T.C. at 1030-31. The court disputed the Service's view that incorporation for the
purpose of exploiting favorable corporate welfare benefits was the equivalent of tax avoidance
motivation. Id.
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Apparently, the Tax Court has adopted a policy whereby a sole
incorporation purpose directed toward exploiting corporate welfare
246
benefits would not necessarily indicate a lack of corporate viability.
The Commissioner's challenge regarding the absence of business
activity by a PSC can be overcome by the incorporating taxpayer's
strict adherence to corporate formalities. For example, a demonstration that the corporate structure was continually respected by third
parties doing business with the PSC, as well as the owners and employees of the corporation, would be conclusive evidence that the PSC
carried on the activities of the business.2 4 7 Meticulous compliance with
state organizational statutes is an obvious necessity for the incorporat24
ing taxpayer.
Once the entity is recognized by the state, only a few formalities
need be undertaken in order that corporate status be granted for tax
purposes. A legitimate employer-employee relationship must be established and maintained between the PSC and its controlling employee. 249 A formal contract may not be necessary, 250 but the employee must demonstrate that the services rendered were performed
on behalf of the corporation pursuant to a consistent employment
25
relationship evidencing actual control by the corporate employer. 1
The remaining requisite formality would be fulfilled by the existence
of contractual relations between the PSC and third parties to which it
renders services.25 2 If the PSC exercises control over the services of its
employee through a legitimate employment relationship, and third
parties engaging in business with the corporation recognize the PSC as
the party in control by transacting through the corporate structure,
the PSC has sufficiently demonstrated that it has carried on the busi-

See id.
See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
248 See Bailey, snpra note 5, at 673.
24 See Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365 (1969) (shareholder employees who failed to
respect their employment relationship with PSC they, controlled allocated corporate income
under assignment of income doctrine).
150 A paper obligation would often be meaningless in the PSC setting because the controlling
employee retains the authority to alter any employment relationship since he represents the
interests of both the corporation and himself. See Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th
Cir. 1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 690 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
251 See Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882 (1982). A steady draw of salary payments
would be a good indication that an employment relationship has been established. See Ach v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aJJ'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899
(1966).
252 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
246
247
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ness of the corporation. 253 Consequently, the incorporating taxpayer
will have earned the recognition of corporate status for tax purposes
and therefore successfully precluded the application of destructive
common law doctrines.
Prior to Foglesong IV, however, compliance with requisite formalities, while capable of achieving corporate recognition, could not
avoid the application of section 482. Beginning with Ach, courts
applied the provision to correct distortion of income perceived between a PSC and its controlling employee. Although the Foglesong IV
court did not dispute the application of section 482 in Ach, 254 it was
clear that the Tax Court had failed to lay a solid foundation for the
initial determination that the dual business requirement could be
2 55
satisfied solely by an employee and the PSC he owned or controlled.
The courts in Borge, Rubin, and finally Keller had built on this
underdeveloped precedent until eventually the dual business requirement of section 482 was no longer a significant factor.2 5' The courts
had initially justified the section's preference and thereafter unjustifiably eliminated the first element of its application without sufficiently
accounting for its basis in this decision.
Apparently, the Seventh Circuit had seen enough. In Foglesong
IV the court took full advantage of the opportunity presented to it and
adopted an objective standard of applicability which not only comported with previous applications of section 482, but more proficiently advanced the traditional objectives of the provision. The
court's interpretation of the "two organizations, trades, or businesses"
requirement is well supported in both logic and legislative history. It
is significant that a corporation can operate only through the services
of its employee(s) and by no other means. Therefore, it follows that an
individual working exclusively for a PSC should be considered engaged solely in the business of the corporation rather than carrying out
a separate business apart from the PSC. Otherwise, all corporations
and their employees would be subject to reallocation under section
482 because they would automatically satisfy the dual business requirement.
253

See, e.g., Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Keller v. Commis-

sioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appealdocketed, No. 82-1414 (10th Cir. 1982); Archiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981).
25'
The court found it unnecessary to question the propriety of the Tax Court's application of §
482, but sufficiently distinguished their factual settings in order to support its holding that the
section was inapplicable. See 691 F.2d at 852.
2-55 See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 148-93 and accompanying text.
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Prior applications of section 482 against a PSC and its controlling
employee who performed no services outside the corporate structure
were obviously unwarranted judicial attempts to compromise between the maintenance of corporate status and the condemnation of
income manipulations within the corporate structure. 257 In exchange
for awarding corporate status to the PSC, the Tax Court required that
all transactions between the corporation and its controlling employee
accurately reflected arm's length dealings, and enforced this policy
through the broad application of section 482. In addition to being
logically unwarranted, this expansive application of the section could
not be supported by a close examination of the legislative history of
the provision. Section 482 was the successor to an early statute authorizing the Service to consolidate accounts of related trades or businesses 25 8 which was primarily aimed at the prevention of "arbitrary
shifting of profits . . . particularly in the case of subsidiary corporations organized as foreign affiliates. ' 259 When the statute was transformed into its present form, Congress declared that the section was
designed to prohibit "arbitrary shifting of profits by making of fictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of
milking. ' 260 Admittedly, Congress intended section 482 to apply to
"all kinds of business activity," 2 ' but employee status alone could not
have been contemplated to be governed by a statute principally en26 2
acted to discourage large corporate income-shifting transactions.
In light of the fact that assignment of income challenges have
become substantially ineffective against the PSC structure, the I.R.S.
is unlikely to accede to the Seventh Circuit's limited application of
section 482. An all-inclusive interpretation of the section, however, is

21

See Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1024 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414

(10th Cir. 1982).
256 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 40 Stat. 260.
251 S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1921).
260 H.R. Rep. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1928).
261 H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
262 This proposition is reenforced by the fact that the IRS itself did not view § 482's scope this
broadly when they sought reallocation based on assignment of income principles in the early Tax
Court case of Rubin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650
(2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 55 T.C. 1155 (1971), af'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1972); see supra
notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
See Fuller, supra note 162, at 479-80, for the proposition that § 482 was a judicial extension
into an area traditionally covered by assignment of income principles without the initial support
of the Internal Revenue Service; see also, BITTKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 15-19-15-21 (1979); Scieroe & Gerber, supra note 136, at
896.
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not the appropriate means to reconcile the conflict in basic tax policies
caused by the nature of the PSC structure. Future judicial opinions
should reflect this view. The IRS could argue that the balance between these policies has been tipped in favor of the policy advocating
recognition of corporate status and against the effectiveness of the
graduated income tax rates. Consequently, the IRS could take the
position that a limited standard of applicability would create a "safe
harbor" which would effectively preclude, in many instances, Service
attacks under section 482 to correct income distortions in the PSC
area.
Admittedly, a PSC's owner-employee, working exclusively for his
corporation, could effectively split his income between himself and
the corporate entity by accumulating earnings of the PSC which were
not paid out as compensation or expenses. The "safe harbor" or "window" for tax avoidance would, however, be limited by the accumulated earnings provisions, which assess an additional tax on the accumulated income of most PSC's over $150,000.263 Moreover, the AET
provisions implicitly authorize the expansion of a corporation through
the retention of earnings which are normally aggregated by a reduction in the salary of the corporation's employee(s). The Tax Court,
however, has adopted a test under section 482 whereby the income
from salary is compared before and after incorporation in order to
determine if an arms length amount has been drawn as compensation
by the corporate employee. 26 4 This application of section 482, which
severely dilutes the purpose of the accumulated earnings tax credit,
completely ignores the necessity of corporations funding anticipated
future growth through the accumulation of corporate income. 26 5 Congress has expressly recognized, through the extension of a minimum
credit, that small corporate businesses would be severely hindered if
they were required to account for all accumulations of earnings intended for business expansion or capital investment. 216 Section 482's
broad application has seriously undermined this legislative policy
through the requirement of arms length compensation terms between
every corporation and its employees. This result is obviously entirely
contradictory to the express intention of Congress, and must no longer
be sanctioned by our courts.
263
214

I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1976 and Supp. V 1981); see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
See Foglesong v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848

(7th Cir. 1982); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1414
(10th Cir. 1982).
215 Petitioner's Brief at 37-38, Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
266 S. Rep. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 90, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD.
NEws 1, 194.
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163

Accordingly, if the limited availability of income splitting in the
PSC area has become undesirable, this allowance should be cured
solely through congressional enactment, rather than through the unwarranted judicial expansion of a statute into an area it was never
designed to govern. Legislation that would remedy the situation could
take the form of a decrease in the accumulated earnings credit or an
amendment of section 482's dual business requirement. The corporate
employee, however, should become subject to reallocation under section 482 only after an express congressional affirmation that the dual
business requirement encompasses "all entities of independent tax
significance."
Stephen T. Golia

